ARTICLES OF INTEREST

 " MASTERPIECE OF CHINA'S TECHNOLOGICAL" Pilot.

Chinese military officials gather around the J-20 stealth fighter after it made its first-known test flight in Sichuan province, Jan. 11, 2011.
China's state-run media on Tuesday denied allegations that the Jian-20 stealth fighter plane unveiled earlier this month used technology stolen from the United States.
According to the Global Times, which has the direct backing of the ruling Communist Party, military officials say the plane is entirely home-grown.
It quoted a senior Chinese test pilot as saying that the plane was a "masterpiece" of home-grown innovation.
"Unlike previous fighters such as the J-7 and J-8, which drew on the merits of aircraft from other countries, the J-20 is a masterpiece of China's technological innovation," it quoted pilot Xu Yongling as saying.
The paper, which is a sister publication of the Communist Party mouthpiece The People's Daily, said allegations that China had acquired the technology from the U.S. amounted to nothing but a Western "smear campaign."
'Breakthrough' features Xu said the aircraft boasted advanced supersonic cruise ability and other "breakthrough" features of a "fifth generation" fighter, such as America's F-22 Raptor.
The paper also quoted a senior defense official as saying that the plane had been the subject of a smear campaign by Western media.
"It's not the first time foreign media has smeared newly unveiled Chinese military technologies. It's meaningless to respond to such speculations," the official was quoted as saying.
Asked about the J-20 at a regular news conference on Tuesday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said: "I don't know about this matter."
Engineer
The Global Times report was an apparent response to the jailing on Monday of a former B-2 stealth bomber engineer by a U.S. court for selling military secrets to China.
The court in the Hawaiian capital, Honolulu, heard that Noshir Gowadia, 66, made profits of at least U.S. $110,000 by selling classified engine technology.
The prosecution said that China needed the technology to help it design a stealth cruise missile that could evade infrared detection.
Former Northrop Grumman engineer Gowadia traveled to China repeatedly between 2003 and 2005 as a freelance consultant to China's cruise missile program, the court heard.
State-run media frequently lauds the country's engineering achievements as examples of Beijing's rising power and prestige.
Russian technology However, defense analysts say the J-20 appears to have been developed more from Russian technology than from anything made in America.
Russian analysts told the industry magazine Jane's Defense Weekly that the Russian origins of the plane were unmistakable.
The surprise test flight came during a rare visit to China by U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, at a time of increasing concern in the United States over China's military ambitions.
Reports of the J-20's maiden flight appeared in official media ahead of Gates' visit. Photos appeared online of a fighter plane in flight, along with accounts of the J-20 fighter making a brief flight from an airport in the south-western province of Sichuan. Newspapers directly controlled by the Communist Party endorsed the mission as "successful."
Gates' visit was aimed at mending military ties strained by the sale of a U.S. $6.4 billion U.S. arms package to Taiwan in January 2010, and amid signs that China's military spending will soon rise sharply.
The official newspaper of the elite Chinese Communist Party school, the Study Times, recently estimated that defense spending would soon rise to take up between 2.6 percent and 2.8 percent of the economy, compared with just 1.5 percent now.

Medical Study Points to Differences in the Brains of RAF Fighter Pilots

New research suggests that the brains of professional fighter pilots are wired differently to the average human, potentially paving the way to streamlining pilot training and facilitating selective recruitment.

 

Results from the study, led by Dr Masud Husain at University College London (UCL), were published in the December issue of the Journal of Neuroscience. Comparative experiments were conducted with a group of 11 seasoned RAF Tornado pilots and another consisting of volunteers with no flight experience.

 

MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) scans and a series of cognitive tests demonstrated that the right-hemisphere white matter of the pilots’ brains exhibit an unconventional structure.

Dr Husain, a professor of Neurology and Cognitive Neuroscience, explained that fighter pilots are an “expert group making precision choices at high speed" and perform at the limits of cognitive ability.

All volunteers participated in the Eriksen Flanker task in which they were instructed to react to a centered and directed target surrounded by distracting symbols. Following this, reaction times were tested by measuring response time to the word “go” amid occasional changes to their instructions. Although no difference was discovered between the groups in the second test, the pilots performed notably faster under the first.

The findings present an avenue for further analysis to attempt to discover whether successful pilots are born with this cognitive ability, or whether their brains undergo a physical change during the learning process. Understanding this could have a huge impact on both recruitment and training.

If found to be a natural ability, an early MRI scan on pilot applicants could immediately rule out those with the “wrong type” of brain, thereby streamlining the process and cutting away the expense of training candidates that are likely to prove unsuccessful.

The results also suggest that training methodology can be realigned to better fit the ways in which pilots assess, respond and learn, while new technologies such as the Helmet-Mounted Display System (HMDS) incorporated with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter may be open to enhancement to correlate further with the pilot’s perspective, and therefore improve situational awareness and reaction time.

 

US Mission to the United Nations:

Remarks at a Security Council Meeting on the Situation on the Korean Peninsula

We welcome this opportunity for the Security Council to discuss recent events on the Korean peninsula. In doing so, it is important that we keep in mind that this tense situation springs from one source and one source alone: the consistently provocative behaviour of North Korea. In July, this Council issued a statement after the North Korean sinking of the South Korean vessel, the Chenoa.
 
The statement condemned the attack and underscored the importance of preventing further such attacks or hostilities against the Republic of Korea. It also called for full adherence to the Armistice Agreement. Nonetheless, North Korea has continued to defy the Council. The regime recently disclosed a uranium enrichment program-activity that directly contravenes Resolutions 1718 and 1874, as well as the 2005 Joint Declaration's clear demand for an end to North Korea's existing nuclear programs.
 
On November 23, North Korea launched a premeditated and unprovoked attack on the island of Yeonpyong. North Korea's deliberate and premeditated armed attack resulted in the death of two Republic of Korea Marine Corps personnel and two South Korean civilians. The attack injured sixteen Republic of Korea Marine Corps personnel and twenty-nine South Korean civilians.
 
It also caused considerable damage to military facilities and destruction of civilian homes and property. A UN Command report, which included participants from nine UN Command-sending states and observers from the Swedish, Polish and Swiss delegations, concluded that this attack constitutes a violation of the Armistice Agreement.
 
The Republic of Korea Marine Corps' response firing on Mu-Do and Gaemeori is justified under the right of self-defense given the necessary, proportional, and timely nature of the response. The Republic of Korea Marine Corps' action in self-defense to the Korean People's Army's armed attack and in response to the Korean People's Army's serious violation of the Armistice Agreement is not a violation of the letter or the spirit of any provision of the Armistice Agreement.
 
The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission report also confirmed the UN Command finding that the North Korean attack violated the Armistice Agreement and that the Republic of South Korea response was an inherent right of self defense.
 
This Council's responsibility to ensure peace and stability weighs heaviest at moments such as these. Yet there has been no statement from this body to clearly condemn the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyong island - an important step to identify and respond to this outrageous act. I would also like to address the concerns that some have expressed regarding plans by South Korea to hold a defensive live fire exercise in the coming days.
 
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that that there is nothing unusual about these planned drills. They are exclusively defensive in nature, and they have been regularly conducted for years-oftentimes on the order of every three months. The conduct of defensive exercises is nothing less than prudent given that North Korean belligerence has cost 50 South Korean lives in the last nine months alone.
 
Despite this litany of provocations, the international community has yet to sufficiently and effectively condemn these acts to the extent that they deserve. South Korea's planned exercises have been widely notified, and the South Koreans have been unceasingly transparent in providing information to airmen and mariners through all of the proper channels.
 
Moreover, the area where the exercises will occur is well south of the Northern Limit Line and south of the five islands which, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice Agreement, are controlled by the UN Commander and have been administered by South Korea since 1953. So, let us be very clear: These defensive exercises pose no danger to North Korea and threaten no North Korean lives. Despite all of this, North Korea has made extensive public threats to undertake massive military action against South Korea if these routine exercises proceed.
 
It is important for this Council to send a strong message that it is not acceptable to threaten military action against a UN member state for conducting a legitimate exercise to provide for its self-defense.
 
The U.S. takes its responsibilities to support peace and stability in the Korean peninsula with the utmost seriousness. We are a treaty ally of South Korea, and we will stand with our ally in the face of threat or attack. At the same time, we have consistently urged calm and restraint to avoid breaches of the Armistice Agreement or UN Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874.
 
We have enthusiastically supported confidence building measures and direct talks between north and south. We have, and will continue to support all efforts to ensure a nuclear weapons free peninsula. And, we have engaged in vigorous diplomacy in an effort to reduce the tensions caused by these latest North Korean provocations. Last week, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg traveled to Beijing where he had productive and positive discussions with senior Chinese leaders on this very topic.
 
We continue to work closely with our Six Party partners to find a diplomatic path that protects peace and stability on the peninsula and fulfills the goals of the 2005 Six Party Joint Statement. We believe we can make progress in cooperation with our partners in Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and Seoul. The door is open to Pyongyang to join and benefit from such an effort, but only if it abandons the misguided notion that violence, threats and provocation are the path toward achievement of its goals.

 

The Radio Controlled IED: Protecting Troops From the 'Unseen Threat' in Afghanistan

Electronic counter measures (ECM) such as jammers are equipment items of enormous importance to soldiers in Afghanistan to counter the threat from radio-controlled IEDs (RCIEDs). ECM, where available and when used correctly, has proven an extremely effective counter against such IED switches.

 'Blue on blue' ECM

ECM is very much a finite resource, in that not all Afghan regional commands (RCs) have it, and this can be seen by the regional trends of IED events. However, a major problem with ECM is not its effectiveness against the RCIEDs, but its impact on other friendly ECM systems.

The mass proliferation of ECM on the battlefield has created the problem whereby ECM systems are jamming one another. This presents a considerable issue for ECM users in preserving their counter-measure and not exposing themselves to the RCIED threat.

 De-confliction of ECM systems is the requirement, but what complicates the search for a solution is the inter-operability (or lack of) of the constituent members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Thus, we are able to see a wider issue of integration of ISAF nations of which ECM de-confliction is but one facet.

RCIEDs are devices that use a radio-controlled switch as an element of their firing system. In many cases, this forms the firing switch, therefore rendering the system a command device that functions upon receiving a signal from a transmitter. However, in other cases, it could also be found in the arming switch of the device where an alternate switch-type detonates the device.

An example of this might be a passive infra-red (PIR) IED that is remotely armed by a radio-controlled transmitter.

 

Such a device is emplaced by a roadside and left unarmed whilst civilian traffic passes. In effect, this provides the potential to limit collateral damage. It is then remotely armed when a target is identified (and sighted) as the next vehicle to detonate the PIR sensor firing switch. Such switches also enable insurgents to emplace devices at times of their choosing rather than imminently before the target approaches.

RCIED deployment process
RCIEDs are relatively uncomplicated devices to manufacture when proper instruction is given and the required materials are available in abundance. RCIEDs require a transmitter and a receiver. Devices can utilise an array of high and low frequency items ranging from mobile phones, personal radios and pagers to keyless garage and car entry fobs. Transmission can differ greatly in nature with different devices offering varying ranges of discrimination and thereby greater usability and safety.

The triggerman must have line of sight to the emplaced device in order to maximise the signal and in order to know when to detonate the device. Their transmitter, perhaps a mobile phone, is the only connection between them and the attack. This is, of course, not an immediately suspicious item and would not likely attract attention from the casual observer. This enables the insurgents to conduct and relay intelligence from thorough battle damage assessments at the scene of the attack.

ECM essentially operates by jamming the signal sent from the transmitter to the receiver. Jamming requires dedicated human interaction by an ECM operator, or ‘bleep’, to direct and programme effectively. ECM, critically, requires power and targeting to operate effectively. Not all frequencies can be jammed, and jamming requires a good knowledge of how to balance power with frequency.

Regional capability and discrepancy
The insurgents in Afghanistan have proven to be a cunning opponent and capable of adapting their tactics around NATO application of ECM. We can see this in the regionalisation of IED trends. In the South, where ECM is in abundance, the enemy instead attacks weaknesses in our use of metal detectors for route clearance by emplacing low or no metal content pressure plate devices.

By contrast, in the East where the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) operate with little ECM, RCIED deployment is a far more frequent phenomenon. ECM-carrying personnel among dismounted units are subject to direct targeting by the INS as the aerials from their equipment are clearly visible. Similarly, the insurgents are able to identify ECM equipped vehicles from those without it and target their attacks according to weaknesses in our own tactics or ECM ‘bubbling’.

ECM can be ‘active’ or it can be ‘reactive’. Active ECM is a setup that is operated constantly and directed, as required. Reactive ECM operates independently, having been pre-programmed to react to certain target frequencies when and where it detects them. The rationale behind this is that a computer can react faster to the situation than a human, thus minimising the exposure to the RCIED threat. The heart of the ECM conflict lies between sets of reactive ECM producing the effect of ‘blue-on-blue fratricide’.

Honing the ECM process
ECM is by no means a new technology, but it remains to completely adapt to the RCIED environment. ECM works chiefly according to a restricted frequency list which accords varying status to protected frequencies that are not to be jammed. Intelligence defines the target, which includes the frequency and RCIED ‘hot spots’, as well as how to apply the ECM. Therein is the obvious solution to the problem - to make these lists available within ISAF forces. However, this information is heavily classified and rarely shared among bilateral allies, never mind broadly disseminated laterally across ISAF members.

Therefore, an alternative solution is currently being investigated that tackles the problem at both ends. First is the literal problem of jammers - jamming one another that must end as fast possible. Second is a new and more integrated approach at the targeting end.

One possible solution essentially seeks to encode friendly ECM with a signal that can be read by all ECM systems. Where a reactive ECM set detects a signal and jams it, it will interrogate its action and, in doing so against a friendly ECM system, will likewise detect a ‘watermark’ embedded in the signal. Upon recognising this signal, the block will be lifted. This solution offers much hope towards mitigating the problem with considerable work being done to reduce the reaction time for ECM to recognise the watermark and lift its jamming effect.

The COI solution
At the other end, efforts are being invested into creating relevant Communities of Interest (COIs) within this arena. The concept of COIs has attracted growing attention dating back to the advent of ‘network-centric capabilities’. COIs are, in essence, a collaborative group of users that pool and share information in pursuit of shared goals.

This naturally (and crucially) requires a shared vocabulary and can be alternatively understood as service-orientated architecture. Data elements are stored, retrieved and analysed in application-independent environments.

The IED database currently under construction will be an excellent example of this and an invaluable asset and will function to alert tactical commanders of the ‘hot spot’ IED indicators based on a legacy of recorded incidents. Such a database is an example of a tactical COI that aims towards the real-time reporting of IED events over a tactical data-link.

Such functions served are: providing an alert, producing a pre-emptive response and producing a report, either to other departments or for purposes of internal revision. The database and the COI around it will therefore work to inform RCIED threat bandwidth as well as the appropriate force protection posture to be adopted.

ECM de-confliction aptly encapsulates wider issues of inter-operability within ISAF that remain in place. Homogeneity of forces’ equipment, capability and training has not been achieved despite considerable efforts to do just that. Successful ‘watermarking’ of ECM equipment will provide a technical solution to de-confliction. However, the creation of an effective COI behind it will provide the means for the institutional change that is required for greater integration and standardisation of ISAF

 

'There isn't any evidence': Has Cyber Turned Into an Invisible War?
The UK Ministry of Defence is increasing investment into its cyber warfare capabilities, amid huge cutbacks to much of the rest of the military.
The newly appointed National Security Council has highlighted 16 national security threats that cannot be downgraded. The four most important of these have been ranked as ‘Tier 1’ and include cyber security, two tiers above conventional large-scale military invasion.
The newly appointed National Security Council has highlighted 16 national security threats that cannot be downgraded. The four most important of these have been ranked as ‘Tier 1’ and include cyber security, two tiers above conventional large-scale military invasion.
The publication forms the basis of the long-anticipated Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) revealed last month, which places cyber war amongst the top of its concerns. Home Secretary Theresa May yesterday declared the urgency of the need to build up security measures in the face of cyber terrorism.
Several weeks ago, Iran’s nuclear power plants were disrupted by a sophisticated computer worm, thought by most cyber specialists to be the work of a national power. Termed ‘Stuxnet’, the malware has been labelled the first recognised ‘cyber weapon’ and is believed to have finally made cyber warfare a reality.
Following the controversy, Iain Lobban, the director of the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), stated that our own national infrastructure is at a high risk of cyber attacks.
"Cyberspace is contested every day, every hour, every minute, every second,” he said. “I can vouch for that from the displays in our own operations centre of minute-by-minute cyber attempts to penetrate systems around the world."
Despite this, one of the leading experts in the country has admitted that defence spending on the issue is difficult to justify to the public because the basis of the strategy lies in an effort to build up resilience before any credible attack causes serious disruption.
Talking to politics.co.uk, Dr Paul Cornish of Chatham House, a world-leading international affairs institute, explained: “The problem with cyber is this is all new - this is all conjecture. In a sense it is the most difficult point to make in terms of public spending.
"This hasn't actually really happened yet. But [you argue] 'we need to spend money to stop it happening'. [The public say] 'give us the evidence'. There isn't any evidence."
Dr Cornish later told the national press that he believed that despite the need to slash Defence funding, a silver lining could develop as budgets will have to be more forward-thinking, focusing on developing key areas such as intelligence and satellites.
Expert theory on the subject has indicated that, in the event of cyber war, a nation could be most under threat from attacks on its transport services, health services or power supplies, or from large-scale financial fraud that could cripple the economy.
Defence Secretary Liam Fox has successfully negotiated with the Treasury to reduce cuts to defence spending from between 10-20% down to 8%, with the help of Prime Minister David Cameron, who has championed national security as a chief concern during this time of hardship across the entire public sector.

 

SEA 1000 Submarine Programme Delivers Australian Counter Punch to Chinese Sea Power

New submarine power

On May 2nd, 2009, the Australian Government issued a White Paper stating its intentions to acquire twelve new submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The new replacement project, SEA 1000, is to replace the six Collins class submarines with a unique Australian design designated to “Defend Australia in the Asia Pacific Century”.

 As China is increasingly gaining dominance in the Pacific region, the need for a counter balance is crucial. Consequently, Australia is now openly tying its submarine build-up to the shifting China-US balance in South East Asia

The Collins class project showed that the Australian need for a unique design could not be procured as an off-the-shelf item from Europe. Initially, the Collins class was intended to be an enlarged Swedish built type 471, but as requirements grew, the design increased from 2,000 tons to 3,051 tons, thus becoming the largest conventional submarine in the modern era.
 
Trading partnerships and strategic paradigms
The complexity and level of technical uncertainty of the Collins design was largely unanticipated by the Australian Navy and, as problems emerged during construction, open conflict between the Navy and the Swedish design authority evolved. As a result, the USN saw an opportunity to tap into the Australian submarine programme and on 10 September 2001 the USN and RAN signed a joint agreement to cooperate on submarine matters. This would effectively secure US involvement in the future submarine project.

The new SEA 1000 project is planned to start replacing the Collins class by 2025 and prolong the RAN’s already long-standing expertise in operating conventional submarines. With improvements in AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) systems and NCW (Network Centric Warfare) capabilities, the conventional submarines have become an even bigger resource to joint operations, thus providing a solution to the lacking operational element in a USN task force.
 
The ability of conventional submarines to operate in the littorals without detection provides a valuable allied asset to a declining USN submarine presence in the Pacific. Facing an estimated 58-88 Chinese attack submarines in 2025, the USN decision to invest in a US-Australian naval relationship is a telling sign of the future Pacific challenges.

With an increased need for capabilities in range, weapon load, endurance and submerged endurance, the projected submarines are destined to become even larger than their predecessors, thus requiring an increased manning level above the current complement of 58 seen in the Collins class.
 
Cooperative strategies in maritime defence
This will prove a monumental task as retention issues have cut the level of operational submarines within the RAN from six to three in recent years. With the increased level of technology incorporated in the projected design, the training of new crews will take years and the cost of doing so will be high.
 
The decision to expand to twelve submarines is very much an ambitious task, as retaining submarine crews and, furthermore, expanding the force to an estimated six times the current size is not likely in a short term perspective.

However, Australia has pledged to honour the relationship between the two countries' naval forces and evidently has committed itself to an immense task. The future of the new Australian submarine project is unquestionably a defining factor in the US South Pacific strategy in the strategically critical years to come.
 
[1] The name of the White Paper issued on 2nd May 2009.

 

Piracy Storm Brews in West Africa: Gulf of Guineau Under Maritime Siege

While media headlines abound and the mass ongoing conventional naval campaign against Somalia’s piracy has dominated the minds of the world’s maritime security experts, security conditions in the Gulf of Guinea continue to decline rapidly.  In fact, the heady mix of failing states, organised crime and a lack of maritime enforcement suggests a problem that will outstrip Somalia both in complexity and scope within the near future.

 

The region’s potent criminal cocktail which has developed over time encompasses the full spectrum of nefarious activity:

In response, regional navies lack the operational capability to patrol effectively or offer a counter to those who bring crime and disorder in their wake.   National and regional security is fragile, at best, and arguably worse than those failing conditions which prompted external involvement a decade ago.  This lack of enduring stability could negatively and decidedly impact the long-term security forecast of both North America and Europe. Western nations increasingly view the region as the nexus of criminal super-highways for smuggling (of all hues) and strategically important oil supplies. 
Any examination of the region throws up a number of contenders for civil war, coups d’état, ethnic unrest, repressed historic enmity or the destabilising influence of organised crime.  Even Nigeria, the region’s powerhouse economy and most populous state is but a stone’s throw from collapse - especially as it faces the threats of insurgency in the Niger Delta and potentially devastating sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims.  Add to this widespread disease, corruption and extreme poverty and the fuse is lit on a powder keg of global proportions. 
Revenue from the extensive network of offshore energy infrastructure is the load-bearing pillar for regional stability, but maritime criminal activity now threatens to undermine this.  A frequent visitor to the region and security expert (Graeme Gibbon-Brooks) reported in 2009:
“The maritime disorder situation in the Gulf of Guinea (GOG) is far less known in the eyes of the international media but no less real.  Maritime disorder affects all areas in West Africa but the effect of criminality, piracy and terrorism in Nigeria’s waters is such that international companies either refuse to trade in Nigeria or are withdrawing their operations and fishermen refuse to put to sea.  Maritime disorder then is choking elements of Nigeria’s income, especially from oil.”
Piracy is alive and well
Organised, maritime criminal activity in the Gulf of Guinea is diverse and seemingly all pervasive.  Piracy and robbery are now so well established as to represent a considerable issue for Nigeria, Cameroon and Angola. In 2009, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) substantiated 28 attacks in their waters but believes the real figure to be twice that. This year alone has seen the Nigerian Navy receive over 100 reports of pirate attacks on ships in their waters. 
On the face of it, these numbers may be under the 200+ pirate attacks that saw 47 hijackings in the Gulf of Aden in 2009, but have been corrupted to such a point as to mask the real scale of the problem. 
Foreign perspective
This view is supported by Peter Pham, director for the National Committee on American Foreign Policy; who argued in January’s Christian Science Monitor that “there are fishing boats attacked at dockside or close to shore, which don’t meet the definition of piracy on the high seas, but if you add all that, the number of attacks certainly would be equal to those off Somalia.” 
There were fifty attacks and ten murders reported by the Nigerian Trawlers Owners Association in January 2008 alone, so it is highly likely the situation in the Gulf of Guinea is worse than commonly understood.  The modus operandi of those who perpetrate these attacks is very different from their brethren in the Gulf of Aden, where crews are well-treated in order to guarantee ransom money.  In the Gulf of Guinea, pirates are much more likely to direct their violence towards the crew in order to steal money or cargo.  Sadly, there are many examples of violent attacks at sea which have resulted in death or serious injury to law-abiding seafarers simply going about their work.
Where piracy meets organised crime
Other equally damaging forms of organised crime fuel maritime insecurity in the region. For instance, illegal fishing by Asian and Europe vessels in the Gulf of Guinea costs these poverty-stricken countries an estimated USD $350 million in lost annual revenue.  In an all too similar parallel to Somalia in the 1990’s, this form of industrial poaching diminishes fish-stocks, denies the local population its stable food source and destroys the local economy.
The second example is Colombian narco products and the trans-Atlantic connections that have been made to get them to market.  There is now a criminal super-highway that fuses Colombian cocaine with North and West African illegal immigrant populations (and weapons and diamonds smuggling) – known as Highway 10.  This criminal super-highway holds great utility for today’s terrorists and criminals alike. 
The majority of Europe’s cocaine is transported by sea to the West African coast, where it is then shipped north along the African and Western European coastlines.  These Atlantic routes facilitate collaboration between criminal organizations and undoubtedly hold merit for an Islamic terrorist organization wishing to use this ‘purpose built’ criminal conduit linking Arab North Africa to potential European targets.  Here is a clear case of a dauntingly multi-faceted problem for the international community and one that demands a coherent, coordinated and comprehensive response.  Unfortunately, state agencies in the West struggle in the face of scant resources and unwillingness on the part of other government departments to commit to this type of long-term capacity-building project.
 According to the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) threat assessment report for 2009/10, West Africa features very highly on the cocaine supply route to Europe.
“West Africa is used by the cocaine trade as a consolidation point and as a centre for logistics, command and control.  Colombian groups pay up to one third of their consignment to West African criminals in return for protection and logistical support.  The bulk of cocaine that remains in the control of the Colombian traffickers is moved to the European market.  However, the payment in cocaine to the West African groups has created a secondary supply to Europe.”  Their assessment substantiates other claims by European authorities that 60% of the cocaine in European markets (estimated at $1.8 billion in 2007) passed through the Gulf of Guinea.
The mass theft of oil is another particularly lucrative activity for organised criminal gangs.  Oil theft is now a common practice and is believed to cost the region some $3 billion each year.  Nigeria is the hardest hit by illegal bunkering and, according to some experts, costs the country as much as 100,000 barrels daily.
Maritime terrorism
Although some dismiss maritime terrorism in the region as a minor irritation, other experts now see it as the preferred area of operation for groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).  MEND are a militant group waging a terrorist / insurgency campaign in the impoverished Niger Delta region.  They have targeted foreign companies and their staff in a bloody campaign that combines terrorism and organised crime in a dangerous hybrid of violence, extortion and corruption.  The impact of their June 2008 campaign is still impacting Nigeria’s national economy.  The region is home to other militant groups such as the Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination - a separatist group that seeks independence for the Bakassi area.  Their attacks upon international shipping demonstrate a willingness to use maritime insecurity as a political dimension within the overall campaign.
Local weakness
Given the pronounced nature and prevalence of regional maritime insecurity, it is disappointing to report that the majority of local navies exist in a general state of irreversible decline and operational ineffectiveness.  Because millions have died in bitter civil wars throughout the region, national armies hold greater political sway than niche organisations - such as a naval force.  None of the region’s many conflicts has had a pronounced maritime dimension and this has promoted a land-based focus on defence spending, training, and equipment procurement.  The following table illustrates the gulf between African Navies and their Army counter-parts:
 

Country

Army

Navy

Nigeria

62,000

8,000

Cote d’Ivoire

6,500

900

DRC

110,000-120,000

6,703

Equatorial Guinea

1,100

120

Gambia

800

70
 
International hubris
Many Western Navies patrol the region and some deliver local capacity-building training - but are these efforts enough?  The answer is an unequivocal 'no'.  Despite the belated small scale efforts of the US Navy to train personnel and deliver improved Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), the tide of criminal and terrorist activity has yet to be turned.  The Royal Navy’s presence is sporadic at best and the French Navy’s posture smacks of neo-colonialism.  The level of capacity-building required to significantly impact upon the activities of the terrorists and criminals is not great and certainly does not require the latest in naval technology to deliver successful results. 
 In the long term, these capacity-building efforts should be seen as a 'spend to save' measure because of the adverse impact on targeted groups such as organised criminals and terrorists.  The issue has been discussed during the 2009 Chiefs of European Navies (CHENS) meeting where the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea was re-emphasised.  A ‘Maritime Co-operation with Africa’ (MCA) Working Group under French leadership was established to explore capacity-building possibilities.  In addition, it was designed to provide suggestions on how to increase regional stability and maritime security through direct contact with the Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and with AFRICOM’s Africa Partnership Station (APS).  All of this carries on with seemingly no tangible result - while West Africa burns (literally).  CHENS members report on the smell of smoke and carry on playing the naval fiddle.
 Summary
The Gulf of Guinea is staring at a precipice of regional maritime insecurity.  The continuing economic, social and political impact is pronounced and will continue unless there is focused investment in both manpower and resources by more capable outside nations or organisations.  The loss of $2 billion US to the local annual economy - from offshore oil, fishing, and commercial shipping - is too large a price to pay for a region which is spasmodically emerging from decades of civil war and anarchy.
 The region produces 5.4 million barrels of oil per day, and it contains 50.4 billion barrels of proven reserves.  Nigeria now supplies 10% of US imported oil and is the world’s eighth largest oil exporter.  Events in Afghanistan and Somalia illustrate the dangers that come from the nexus between organised crime, terrorism and failed/failing states.  While many look to Africa for an African solution to retake control of their seas, they can’t achieve this without timely Western assistance.
 Our collective inactivity is the product of a paucity of constabulary platforms and hamstrung political will which fractures any hope of a comprehensive approach to the problem.  So perhaps if we were to learn a lesson or two from Somalia and Afghanistan rather than just identify them, shouldn’t our militaries provide a gentle hand on the tiller and guide the people of the Gulf of Guinea towards a more secure and stable future?

 

Man and Machine Synergy:

Erasing the Boundaries Between Soldiers and Equipment

Soldiers across Europe are placing increasing significance on modernisation systems that will allow individual troops to be fully integrated into the wider battle space network.

 France is escalating its aggressive plan to outfit its soldiers with FELIN (Fantassin à Equipements et Liaisons Intégrés), the infantryman-integrated communications equipment system. The kit offers an electro-optical weapon sight, a mini-computer display screen that conveys real-time data updates, as well as sensitive voice recognition. Troops will be training with the system ahead of projected operational deployment in late 2011.

The French defence procurement agency (DGA) has awarded contracts to adapt 1,800 of the Army’s vehicle interiors in order to provide enough room for soldiers equipped with FELIN. Importantly, the vehicle systems will be synchronised with the requisite kit to allow troops to connect themselves to the AV power supply and recharge the power plants for their digital components. Around 30 vehicles per month are in line to be upgraded between now and 2015.

In Germany, the IdZ modernisation system has received a further catalyst this year with more new orders since its inception in 2004. In addition to its operational contributions, the technology has likewise been seamlessly integrated with various vehicles in the German fleet - the enhanced version will be linked with the Boxer MRAV and PUMA IFV. Weapons will be stationed onboard for modular selection.

 Similar in nature to FELIN, troops plug into these vehicles to recharge, and communication can be established with both the internal intercom system and with remote units, as well as with other command echelons via the vehicle radio. Troops can also operate independently of the next higher command level for up to 72 hours through the use of a transportable base station external to the vehicle. Additionally, this provides a robust spectrum of modern features - from fuel cells to computer and radio equipment.
 Meanwhile, 35,000 units of the UK’s FIST (Future Integrated Soldier Technology) system are being prepared for distribution to British troops within the next 10 years. Along with land vehicle integration, the technology is designed to link with kinetic firepower assets, UAVs and other platforms. Switzerland, Spain, and the Czech Republic also have Future Soldier programmes under way which will all promote C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) at their core.

 Increasingly, combat vehicles are providing the critical base of network operations, resulting in the battlefield taking on the role of a digital terrain, and thus providing and supporting commanders with real-time situational awareness (SA) and combat identification (CID).

 The successes of the deployed IdZ and the FELIN trials in their interaction with armoured vehicles will be a boon to those projects still in development throughout Europe and the rest of the world. Hand in hand, man and machine are expected to operate with a range of complex advantages as standard - from the ability to map the battle space layout and its obstacles, to relaying the exact position of enemy combatants.

Axe To Fall On UK Troop Numbers
Posted: 26/08/2010 12:00:00 AM EDT
The UK Defence Secretary has indicated that the number of serving soldiers and officers in the British Army will be reduced as part of the swathe of spending cuts to be made in light of the ongoing Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).
Aside from vehicle and equipment cutbacks, Dr. Liam Fox has publicly suggested that the number of employed personnel within the Forces would be one of the aspects at the forefront of discussions to combat a £500m deficit.
“Without cost containment in the current programs, we have no option but to either cut the programs currently under way or curtail investment in future programs.”
Fox has been called on by the UK Treasury to slash the defence budget by up to 20 per cent in urgent plans that could begin to take effect by the end of the year, according to the National Audit Office.
Analysts believe that up to 30,000 of the present 175,000 personnel may be slashed, with two thirds of that figure falling on the Army.
The main concern lies in the fact that the forces are already perceived as being overstretched, with 10,000 troops expected to remain in Afghanistan for several more years.
All defence programmes are to be re-evaluated as part of the SDSR, with key contentions being whether to move forward with anti-nuclear defence system Trident; whether one of the Royal Navy’s brand new aircraft carriers should be auctioned off; or whether the current order for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter should now be reduced.
The upshot of these anticipated cutbacks is expected to reduce Britain’s military presence worldwide and proscribe it from being involved in future campaigns on the same scale as it has been in recent years. However, it would still be the largest armed force among NATO’s European members.


Prime Minister David Cameron raised the possibility that Britain could start withdrawing troops from Afghanistan next year, following US President Barack Obama’s hopes to ease American troop numbers in the region from July.


"The faster we can transition districts and provinces to Afghan control, clearly the faster that some forces can be brought home.”
Final decisions on spending for the next 5 years will be announced by October when the SDSR is set to be revealed.

Counter-Insurgency Star Wars: Geospatial Defence, Intelligence and Reconnaissance in Afghanistan

(Geospatial systems hold many benefits for both the civilian and military communities, providing detailed, mission critical information for use in military operations and infrastructure development.

The progression of asymmetric warfare in the Afghan theatre has produced many new challenges, both for operational specialists as well as tactical and command planning elements.

Geospatial systems have played a pivotal role in combating insurgency within urban hotspots in the Afghanistan war - and are also employed by Provincial Reconstruction Teams in their efforts to rebuild the country.

Examining those coalition forces executing the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mission provides insight both into the challenges and opportunities which are facing the industry worldwide, as well as into the necessity for interoperability within geospatial defence and intelligence.

                    NATO has signed agreements with a number of different countries to better utilise geospatial data from equipment such as UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) with troops on the ground.
Upon signing the agreement with NATO, France's national armament director, Laurent Collet-Billon, stated openly: "We are, in essence, looking at a shift of paradigm. Traditionally, we have worked on developing capabilities nationally and then worked–and paid–again at the Alliance level to make them interoperable.
"Now we are seeking to engage nations in a direct, comprehensive approach that will deliver capabilities that are born interoperable."
Collaboration in Geospatial Systems
One of the issues that quickly came to light when military operations commenced in Afghanistan was the lack of accurate and up-to-date geospatial data available, a phenomenon particular to many remote regions of Asia.
In a bid to solve this, many nations began the process of collating geospatial data on the areas where their troops were deployed. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in the US highlighted that this led to duplication of data.
To combat this, the Afghanistan Production Coordination Working Group was formed, encompassing a number of European nations and headed by the NATO command in charge of ISAF operations. 
The group is responsible for coordinating individual efforts so geospatial systems meet the dynamic needs of troops on the ground.
NGA explained: "To date, seven nations are producing vector data, image city maps, Multinational Geospatial Co-Production Derived Graphics (MGCP-DGs), and full specification topographic line maps over most of Afghanistan, using commercial imagery."
Efforts were also made to ensure that the supply chain was managed sufficiently to ensure that troops were not provided with duplicate maps and the most accurate and up-to-date documents were shipped out.
To ensure that the collection of geospatial data continues after military operations are completed, NGA has been working with the Afghanistan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office. Members of the office have been working with NGA representatives to deal with management challenges and to better understand the technical challenges of geospatial systems.
 

Geospatial Systems and Reconstruction

The war in Afghanistan also serves to highlight how the global community can utilise geospatial systems after kinetic operations have been terminated.
Last year, NATO created a map illustrating flooding patterns in the country, which was subsequently handed over to Afghan authorities in Kabul.
Created by the Command and Control Agency (NC3A) Geo Team, the Afghanistan Flood Hazard Map (AFG-FHM) is intended to be used by the country's authorities to ensure construction does not take place in areas affected by flooding and to ensure flood defence measures are positioned effectively.
NATO also reported that the map will assist landmine clearing teams in prioritising locations, thus preventing landmine migration. 
Following the issues experienced by coalition troops in relation to flooding in 2006, John Teufert, NC3A Geo Team Chief, said that the map would hopefully prevent such difficulties in the future.
"This did not only affect military operations and logistical tasks, but also lack of actual data was sufficiently hindering the emergency response and emergency aid operations which NATO delivers to flood victims," Teufert explained.
"It was because of that reason that ISAF requested NC3A's support to create a Flood Map for entire Afghanistan at a minimum scale of 1:250,000."